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Rights 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Frédérick Armstrong∗ 
Résumé 
La pratique des droits de l'homme est souvent décrite comme une entreprise qui 
vise à établir des standards minimaux pour guider l'action des États et des 
individus. Dans cet article, je tente de remettre en question la position minimaliste 
défendue par deux auteurs, James Nickel et James Griffin, en défendant une thèse 
selon laquelle la philosophie et la morale ne devraient pas être limitées par la 
pratique et les circonstances du monde. Sans apporter une réponse précise à la 
question de la faisabilité des droits de l'homme tels qu'on les connaît, je soutiens 
que le minimalisme défendu par Griffin et Nickel n'est pas nécessaire, ni 
souhaitable, dans la lutte pour la défense des droits de l'homme, lutte dans 
laquelle la philosophie a un rôle de premier ordre à jouer. 
“The greatest improvement in the productive powers  
of labour, and the greater part of the skill, dexterity,  
and judgment with which it is any where directed,  
or applied, seem to have been the effects  
of the division of labour.” 
Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations, 1776 
Human rights are oftentimes described as minimal standards for a 
“decent human life”. On that account of human rights (HRs), we 
should take the concept of human rights as a guide for action for 
states, governments, and other international agents in order to ensure 
they provide the minimal conditions for human life. HRs, it is said, 
are not a list of great aspirations for the best human life possible ; they 
are, instead, minimal standards by which States should abide. Having 
said that, the question of the minimalism of HRs is even more 
difficult when one realizes the term “minimalism” is actually 
______________ 
∗  L’auteur est étudiant à la maîtrise en philosophie (Université de Montréal). 
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equivocal. First, it can involve trimming down the list of HRs to a 
minimal set of “basic” HRs. This minimalist list would be more likely 
accepted by all, or so the argument goes. Secondly, it can mean that 
HRs should only be minimally demanding, thus taking the scarcity of 
resources available in a given situation into account. Finally, it can 
mean that we should only insist on rights that are feasible, rejecting 
high ideals entirely.   
The thesis I defend in this paper is that one should not (or at least 
one does not have to) concentrate on either of the minimalist accounts 
of HRs presented here. Moreover, I shall argue for a more expansive 
account of HRs defending a more critical and political use of the 
concept. I should also note that I do not focus on any of these 
particular forms of minimalism. Rather, I wish to critique minimalism 
as an a priori attitude towards human rights, taken to be part of 
political and theoretical endeavors. Indeed, all the works I discuss in 
this paper do not follow the same logic and are not part of the same 
school of thought. However, they all, in one way or another and for 
various reasons, argue for a minimalist approach to the study of 
human rights. Thus, this paper is more a general critique of 
minimalism and not specific defense of maximalism. I reject 
minimalism as a practical and philosophical necessity, but I cannot 
offer a defense maximalism in this article.  
I must recognize that given that I am aiming at several targets, my 
position could confuse the reader. He or she might wonder what 
authors or what position I am really critiquing or what exactly I am 
defending. Because this confusion is understandable, I want to be as 
transparent and clear as possible: my critique of minimalism is 
subordinate to a defense of a critical political philosophy. Political 
philosophy has been throughout history, and should endure as such, 
a critical endeavor in which philosophers argued for what the world 
ought to be like. Saying, like some of the authors I critique, that the 
practice and theory of HRs should be kept minimalistic because a 
more expansive account would not fit the world as it is, is precisely 
the attitude I am condemning in this article. 
The strategy I want to employ in order to rebuke minimalism is 
twofold. First, I will address the arguments that justify a defense of 
HRs as minimal standards. Secondly, I will defend a critical and 
political approach to HRs that would take them to be tools in the 
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struggle for justice and equality. Basically, HRs should be taken as 
they are: HRs are supposed to give us an idea of how the world ought 
to be like. Following that line of thought, the concluding paragraphs 
will present a discussion on the role of political philosophy in the 
practice of HRs. Basically, I argue that the best way to bring forth 
progress for justice and equality is to ensure a division of the moral 
labour between political philosophy and other social sciences – which 
is why I quote, rather provocatively, Adam Smith. My conclusion is 
that political philosophers need to think of human rights as tools for 
political progress. 
I should also note that the thesis I am defending in this paper is 
concomitant with a very particular account of justice. That is to say 
my views on HRs are embedded in a socialist-egalitarian conception 
of social and global justice. Unfortunately, I do not have the space to 
defend that position in and of itself, so I will not be able to answer 
the difficult question: Why (not) socialism (on a global scale) ? Even 
though a more elaborate answer is needed, I remain certain that the 
only serious objections to a strong socialist-egalitarian view of global 
justice and HR are questions of feasibility and implementation – I will 
not address these specific objections in this paper. I will however 
make the (some would say wild) assumption that the principles of a 
socialist-egalitarian view of global justice and HRs are sound. 
Because of these very real difficulties set forth by the question of 
feasibility and implementation, I remain neutral on the nature or, 
better, the structures of this particular account of global justice – be it 
a World federation, a World State, etc.. Having said that, I believe 
that a rather strong version of egalitarianism is already built-in the 
global practice of HRs. I would therefore tend to argue for global 
egalitarianism (and not a minimal one). However, we will see in the 
concluding paragraphs that egalitarianism does not necessarily entail 
that HRs are meant to defend justice between States – unfortunately, 
this is a difficult problem I will not be able to adequately address 
here.  With those introductory remarks out of the way, I will start by 
addressing Nickel's defense of a minimalist account of human rights. 
James Nickel offers in Making Sense of Human Rights “four strong 
reasons” for a minimalist approach regarding human rights1. 
______________ 
1 Nickel, J. (2007), Making Sense of Human Rights, p. 37-38.  
Frédérick Armstrong 
 26 
Beginning with the assumption that human rights “aim at avoiding 
the terrible rather than achieving the best”, Nickel claims that a 
minimalist conception of HRs is essential in order to ensure (1) that 
HRs keep a level of high priority and universality ; (2) that the 
practice of HRs “leaves ample room for democratic decision-making 
at the national level” ; (3) that HRs can be accepted by “countries 
who prize their independence and self-determination” ; (4) and finally 
that “by limiting human rights to minimal standards we make them 
more likely to be feasible in the vast majority of the world's 
countries”. 
That list appears to be the most basic (and perhaps the strongest) 
arguments for a minimalist account of HRs and, for that reason, they 
will constitute a sort of benchmark for us to test my thesis. If I can 
show that all or at least some of these arguments are problematic or 
at least not necessary, we will have a case against the so-called 
minimalism of HRs. At the very least, we will have reasons to 
mitigate that minimalism.  
Because of the very basic character of these arguments I will not 
address them fully now and I will rather refer to them throughout the 
paper. First, I will link argument (4) to the concern regarding 
“demandingness” raised by Griffin's use of the “Ought Implies Can 
principle” (OIC principle) ; argument (1), coupled with (2) and (3), 
bring up the issue of parochialism that I will address in a discussion 
of Seyla Benhabib's thesis for “another universalism”2 . I will refer to 
the same arguments in order to push Beitz’s arguments further than 
what his latest work on HRs suggested3. Finally, I will mobilize 
argument (1) precisely to argue in favor of a more expansive account of 
HRs in the last part of this article. Let us start with the discussion of 
Griffin's thesis. 
______________ 
2 Benhabib, S. (2007), “Another Universalism : On the Unity and Diversity 
of Human Rights”, p. 7-32. 
3 Note that the arguments (2) and (3), along with a conception of HRs as 
ground for international concern, are the arguments that made Charles Beitz 
shy away from making a strong link between a theory of HRs and a theory 
of global justice. We can see the evolution by comparing “What Human 
Rights Mean”, p. 36-46 and Beitz, C. (2009), The Idea of Human Rights, p. 142-
143. I will come back to this in my later discussion. 
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James Griffin’s project is to give a more determinate definition of 
what HRs are and what they aim to protect.4 His goal, as Allen 
Buchanan notes, is not to give an account of the HRs practice. Rather 
it aims at defining a theory of HRs without reference to the practice. 
This theory would then be used to build a critical appraisal of the 
practice.5 His project is therefore two-fold : first, defining HRs, and 
second comparing his definition against practice to check for 
“discrepancies between philosophy and international law ”6. The 
nexus of Griffin's project is therefore to correct the practice of HRs 
with a solid and definite conception of what HRs truly are. Although 
most of the discrepancies Griffin identifies follow from his 
personhood account of HRs, the notions of feasibility and 
minimalism loom on the side7. In a sense, feasibility and a 
commitment against over-demandingness is somewhat of a meta-
concern for Griffin's theory of HRs ; that is why I focus on these 
aspects to offer a critique of Griffin's account of HRs. 
If, according to Griffin, the issue of over-demandingness is 
important for our account of HRs, it is because it is also important 
for morality in general. For James Griffin, morality needs to adopt a 
sort of realism. It should always take into account the capacity of 
actual moral agents8, that is actual human beings with all the 
motivational limits this implies. Essentially, Griffin argues that we 
cannot let morality demand things that we know agents are incapable 
of fulfilling. He even argues that “a norm that ignores the limited 
nature of human agents is not an 'ideal' norm, but no norm at all9”. 
To illustrate his thesis, he cites Kant's famous phrase : “Ought Implies 
Can”. According to Griffin that phrase means that we do not have 
moral obligations to do something that we cannot do. This, I think, is 
a grave error and I will try to show that Griffin's use of the OIC 
principle is highly problematic for several reasons.  
______________ 
4 Griffin, J. (2008), On Human Rights. 
5 Buchanan, A. (2010), “The Egalitarianism of Human Rights”, p. 680. 
6 Griffin, J. (2008), On Human Rights, chapter 11. 
7 Although I also find Griffin's personhood account to be problematic, I will 
not address that question here. 
8 Stern, R., (2004), “Does 'Ought' Imply 'Can' ? And did Kant think it 
does ?”, p. 44. 
9 Idem. 
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First of all, let us remember that Griffin's minimalism is based on 
a so-called “realist” conception of human nature and capacities. With 
that in mind, Griffin thinks that ethics should “ensure that our 
abstract principles are adequate to our practice, but also to 
accommodate the way in which our practice – our human nature with 
all its limitations and the needs of our actual societies – determine the 
content of our principle10”. According to that conception of ethics, 
we need to look at the capacity of the moral agents before we say 
what moral demands we should make of them. 
Griffin tries to present several ethical cases to prove that morality 
really is limited by human nature11. He argues, for example, that in a 
situation where several children are drowning, including one's own, 
one cannot save all the children because agents have a permitted partiality 
towards their own child. Because this permitted partiality is bound by 
human nature (it is natural to prefer one's own child), it is not true 
that we ought to save all the children (we do not even need to get in a 
discussion about one's physical capacity to save but one child)12. 
Griffin argues here for a “motivational limit” to morality. 
Motivational limits are bound in human nature, therefore we cannot 
demand that moral agents act beyond those limits.  
Griffin then parallels his approach to morality in general to the 
practice of HRs. So, for him motivational limits also apply in the 
context of HRs – more specifically to socio-economic rights. He 
argues that “[HRs’] demands must stay within the capacities of the 
sort of people that society seeks to regulate. We should do what, with 
present resources, we can to raise the destitute to the minimum 
acceptable level13”. Here, I must admit that I agree partly with 
Griffin. Of course, at the level of implementation of moral demands 
and requisites, motivational limits are a real issue. However, I think 
that the questions of motivational limits should be issues in social 
sciences and not in philosophy or ethics. That is to say, philosophy 
______________ 
10 Griffin, J. (2008), On Human Rights, p. 74-75. 
11 Although I could offer a more extensive critique of the very notion of 
“human nature” and its validity in any philosophical argumentation, I will 
have to defer. Suffice it to say that “human nature” is a problematic  concept 
in its own right due to lack of any empirical evidence of its very existence. 
12 Griffin, J. (2008), On Human Rights, p. 72. 
13 Ibid., p. 99. 
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should focus on identifying and justifying moral demands without 
limiting them with human weaknesses or any other “facts14”. So, if 
the practice of HRs is too demanding, here and now, it’s not a 
philosophical problem, but a political one. 
Although I hope to make this argument clearer throughout this 
article – it acts as a “fil d'Ariane” for my thesis – I need to explain 
what I mean here. Philosophical approaches to morality are 
oftentimes divided in two broad categories : theories of moral 
principles and theories of moral actions15. That is, a philosopher 
could choose to search for the principles one should follow in order 
to attain the “good life” or find out what actions one should do in 
order to lead a “good life”. We could illustrate the two different 
approaches in regards to the links between principles and actions 
with the following : the first would have the moral principles (and 
only these) guide one’s actions, whatever the circumstances ; the 
second would leave the principles aside in order to evaluate which 
actions is best in each circumstance. 
Even though this last paragraph could lead us in a much deeper 
debate in meta-ethics and epistemology, I do not want to embark on 
it just yet. The only argument I wanted to shed light on was that 
when Griffin limits morality with human motivation, he is limiting 
moral principles with individuals’ actions (or capacities to act). In 
contrast, I believe ethics should provide us with the principles of 
morality that should, in term, guide us in finding out what we should 
demand of moral agents. Within this approach, neither the content 
nor the justification of moral demands are conditional to moral 
agent’s capacity to act according to them. By limiting HRs, or 
morality, with human motivation, Griffin is not only untrue to Kant’s 
approach to morality (this fact renders his use of the OIC principle 
even more problematic), but he also operates a radical rejection of 
demandingness in morality that is not philosophically necessary and 
perhaps politically problematic. 
A last note on human motivation before we move on : although 
Griffin feels motivational limits are part of human nature, he does 
______________ 
14 I am referring here to G.A. Cohen's (2003), “Facts and Principles”,  
p. 211-245. This issue will come back later in the article. 
15 I have no intention of delivering an exhaustive list of approaches to 
morality and ethics. I just want to illustrate my thesis. 
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address the objection according to which motivation is “plastic” and 
that it can evolve. For defenders of that conception, people could be 
inspired by a severe and rigorist ethics. The demands of such an 
ethics could be unrealistic, but because this rigor demands 
extraordinary strength and discipline, one could imagine a person 
wanting to emulate this high ideal of morality. In that context 
defending a rigorous ethics would encourage, inspire, motivate people 
to act according to the best mores possible.  
Moreover, the acquisition of knowledge could help make 
motivation more likely. One could be more motivated to act in 
certain ways, however demanding they are, after learning these 
specific actions would have a great impact on a particular problem. 
However, Griffin simply dismisses those arguments saying that an 
“unreachable goal” is an oxymoron, a logical flaw morality has to do 
without. He also argues that if motivation is changing, it is also highly 
unstable. For example, Griffin argues that an extremely rigorous 
ethics inspired the Red Guard during the Chinese Cultural 
Revolution. However, the very same “fanatics” eventually took part 
in the Tienanmen Square demonstration16. All this to say that 
motivation is highly unstable. Griffin argues that “the sorts of ethics 
that can so revolutionize motivation are not plausible, and the sorts 
that are plausible cannot so revolutionize motivation17”. But apart 
from the fact that his example is not empirically verifiable (and 
similar to a straw-man fallacy), Griffin shows here a pessimism that is 
uncalled for. Can’t we imagine something between complete 
indoctrination to highly demanding ethics and complete abdication of 
moral demandingness on the basis of human limitations ? 
Now, after this long tangent, let us come back to the moral duty 
of a parent to save drowning children. I would now like to address 
the distinction between moral obligation and moral blame. If, as 
Griffin would surely believe, we cannot blame the parent for saving 
his own child in priority, it does not mean that he did not have a 
prima facie duty to save all the children. Griffin's argument would 
surely be that one cannot have a moral duty to do what one cannot 
do. Hence, the parent does not have a moral duty to save all the 
______________ 
16 Griffin, J. (2008), On Human Rights, p.73. 
17 Ibid., p.73. 
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drowning children ; therefore we cannot blame the parent for not 
fulfilling his or her moral duty. Because “ought implies can”, and 
because the parent could not possibly save all the children, it is not 
true that she ought to save all of them. 
But saying that the parent could not save all the children is not in 
contradiction with the statement according to which the parent had 
the moral obligation to save all the children. Even if we have legitimate 
reasons to withhold moral condemnation if he or she does not fulfill 
this obligation, it does not mean that the moral obligation is dropped. 
Of course one would be rather puritan if he were to accuse the parent 
of not fulfilling his moral duty if he or she were to save only his or 
her child. But I say morality ought to be as puritan as that, and that is 
precisely Kant’s view of it. 
We need here to see what the OIC principle means when set in a 
rigorous morality such as Kant’s. According to Kant, the moral law is 
a categorical imperative that is accessible a priori through reason and 
that is available for all reasonable agents18. It suffers no exception, 
especially no exception based on experience and practice19. The 
moral law, and that is why the categorical imperative is universal in 
form and not content : “Act only according to that maxim whereby 
you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law.” 
This formal definition of the moral law is always available to the 
moral subject. The material circumstances have nothing to do with 
morality. That is not to say that the moral agent will always act 
according to the moral law, but only that he will always feel the duty 
to act in “good will”.  
To illustrate how human motivation is always bound by the 
categorical imperative and morality, Kant offers an example that 
resembles Griffin’s but that ends with a completely opposite 
conclusions : imagine that a man is asked to accuse another man that 
he knows to be honest ; if he does not do so, he will be killed. That 
man, says Kant, will know that he can do what he ought to do (in that 
______________ 
18 Carnois, B. (1973), “Position de la liberté par rapport à elle-même : 
l'autonomie de la volonté”,  p. 81. 
19 Idem. 
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case not lie). It does not mean he will do it, only that he knows he can20. 
In that example, Kant shows that the moral law is always available to 
moral subjects even though they do not always act according to it. 
Of course, Griffin would perhaps think that this example is 
absurd because morality is supposed to be action-guiding and asking 
the impossible (or at least improbable) of moral agents is at least 
counter-productive, at worst plainly absurd, because after all ought 
implies can. However, Robert Stern notes that Griffin makes several 
assumptions that are uncalled for. First, he takes for granted that “if a 
moral rule says that what is right is something we cannot do, it is 
pointless ; and second, if a moral rule is pointless, it cannot really be a 
moral rule21”. However, we can legitimately argue that strong moral 
demands are not pointless. Indeed, they can be a source of great 
inspiration. The man in Kant's example has access to the moral law 
and knows that it would take great character and compose to act in 
good will. This could then inspire him to act in good will. Although 
this argument leads to a debate in moral psychology, I do not want to 
get into it as it is reasonable to think that appeals to great moral 
figures can inspire people in their moral practice (such inspiration can 
be found in the infamous “What would Jesus do ?” motto). And that, 
in and of itself, would constitute a “point” to high moral standards. 
Furthermore, the fact that moral law is demanding and that 
people will not always act according to it is irrelevant to the definition 
of moral demands. Again we can bring up the argument from blame 
and agree with Griffin that a moral agent is not to be blamed for 
actions he could not avoid. However, Stern notes that there is a 
difference between evaluating an agent and evaluating an action22. 
When one condemns an action he is not necessarily blaming the 
agent. Indeed, one could say that a person's actions are morally 
reprehensible, but because she was in such a dire situation, she, as a 
moral agent, should not be condemned.  
______________ 
20 That example is cited in Carnois, B. (1973), “Position de la liberté par 
rapport à elle-même : l'autonomie de la volonté”, p. 103. For original see: 
Kant, Akademie Ausgabe V 54. 
21 Stern, R., (2004), “Does 'Ought' Imply 'Can' ? And did Kant think it 
does ?”, p. 50. 
22 Ibid., p. 47. 
Human Rights as tools for political progress 
  33 
That is to say we can rightly argue that one had a moral duty to do 
X, but because he was in a situation where he could not do X, the 
moral blame for not doing X should be less severe. The evaluation of 
moral action is always an after-the-fact enterprise in which the facts 
have to be taken into account – the moral condemnation will be 
strong or weak depending on whether or not  the agent had strong or 
weak reasons not to act according to the moral law. But the definition 
of moral duty (to follow the moral law, as Kant would have it) cannot 
be bound by the facts around which the action has taken place. 
Following from that statement, it is clear to me that Griffin's 
interpretation of the OIC principle is much too strong and contrary 
to Kant's view of it. 
The view I am defending is that morality is (or at least should be) 
independent from practice and human limitations. Again, I did not 
aim to contradict the OIC principle plain and simple. One could 
point out that although it would be awfully nice (and morally 
desirable) if people could solve problems with a simple gesture, one 
cannot demand of a moral agent to clap his hand to end poverty – 
obviously, one cannot do that. Remember, ought implies can. But 
there is a big difference between limiting moral demands with the 
“laws of physics” and limiting them with the so-called “human 
nature” with whatever motivational limits that concept can carry. In 
limiting the demands of morality through his strong interpretation of 
the OIC principle, therefore limiting the list of HRs to what human 
agents can do, here and now, Griffin goes too far. 
Now Griffin could rightfully argue that I also need to make a 
distinction between desirability and feasibility. Of course, he would 
say, it would be absolutely desirable if we could arrive at the highest 
and most desirable moral standards through the defense of HRs, but 
it is not feasible, plain and simple. 
To that hypothetical answer I respond by arguing that in the 
context of human rights, we do not have to worry all too much about 
the highest and most desirable moral standards. That is simply 
because we already have something to work with ; that is the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Of course, Griffin, Nickel 
and many others, would argue that the list is already blown out of 
proportion with ludicrous demands such as “holidays with pay” that 
we cannot possibly implement in most countries. But frankly, if we can say 
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that feasibility is a spectrum and not an either-or concept, demanding 
for holidays with pay is far from being as impossible as demanding 
that people get wings (however desirable that would be)23. 
So now that we have reasonable doubts concerning whether the 
OIC principle necessarily sets a strong limitation for the justification 
and the content of human right, we need to address Nickel's 
arguments (1), (2) and (3). We will examine, more specifically, 
dangers of parochialism and ethnocentrism that would call for a more 
minimalist account of HRs. The thesis I will defend here is similar to 
the one I have defended against Griffin ; basically, regarding the 
universality of human rights, the ought comes before the can. 
What I mean by this is that the idea of universal HRs is not 
“about what there is but about the world we reasonably ought to want 
to live in24”. I will be the first to admit that there is a lot of problems 
concerning the idea of universal HRs, especially given the history of 
Western colonialism and its crusades to civilize the barbaric peoples – 
one cannot deny that atrocities have been committed to civilize the 
World. So we must approach that characteristic – universality – with 
a healthy dose of skepticism. Again at the level of implementation, a 
minimalist account of HRs might be more easily accepted by people 
of different cultural and ethical backgrounds. An argument for 
minimalism here would be that we have a lot more chance to find a 
common denominator for HRs if they are not too demanding. 
Having said that, I do not think that we need (or ought) to prune 
down the list of human rights to make it more acceptable. 
As I said, I do not want to discuss the content of HRs. The 
closest thing we have to a commonly accepted set of HRs is readily 
______________ 
23 I am aware that this statement needs a much longer development.  Issues 
of feasibility and desirability have been covered in much more details in the 
literature, but I take as a reasonable enough claim to say that feasibility is not 
only an either-or concept to take it for granted. Because I do not have the 
space and because my point was more to show that the OIC does not 
necessarily warrant a strong limitation of moral demands I will avoid this 
discussion. For a discussion on that issue see: Cowen, T. (2007), “The 
Importance of Defining the Feasible Set”, p. 1-14, section 3.3. 
24 For the reminder of the argument I am inspired by Benhabib, S. (2007),  
“Another Universalism: On the Unity and Diversity of Human Rights”, 
p. 14. 
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available and I shall be satisfied with that for the time being. Yet it is 
important to have a conception of HRs in which we can keep the 
power of universality without falling into moral imperialism. What 
Seyla Benhabib argues for is another kind of universalism that is not 
necessarily based on an essentialist account of human nature (or 
culture) and that does not entail a specific list of HRs. She is more 
interested in a universalism of justification. Let me further develop 
this. 
Her universalism is based on moral universalism, which entails 
that “everyone is entitled to equal moral respect25”. Now that would 
not be saying a lot since that is what HRs are supposed to do anyway, 
but she also argues for a “justificatory universalism26”. That notion is 
based on the assumption that human beings share normative reason 
that allows for political deliberation, on a basis of equality between all 
participants. This deliberation should aim at defining what all the 
participants can value as the common good. Again the feasibility of 
such a deliberation is a legitimate concern that would deserve a 
development of its own, but I will not do it here. Suffice to say that a 
hypothetical forum, in which all can have a say on what they believe 
is good, could permit us to come up with an idea of HRs acceptable 
by all reasonable agents taking part in the debate. Benhabib rightfully 
notes that “moral universalism does not entail or dictate a specific list 
of human rights beyond the protection of the communicative freedom 
of the person ; nor does justificatory universalism do so27 ”. 
Therefore universalism in our conception of HRs is not only 
desirable, it also does not necessarily present the features of moral 
imperialism that we reasonably want to reject. 
However, one could argue that since HRs are supposed to be the 
foundation on which one can legitimatize external intervention, the 
only universalism morally acceptable entails a very minimalistic 
account of human rights28. Having said that, I believe, as does 
______________ 
25 For the reminder of the argument I am inspired by Benhabib, S. (2007),  
“Another Universalism: On the Unity and Diversity of Human Rights”, 
p. 12. 
26 Ibid., p. 12. 
27 Ibid., p. 13. 
28 I will briefly come back to the question of interventionism in my 
concluding paragraphs. 
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Benhabib, that moral egalitarianism implies a more cosmopolitan 
view of justice. It may be true that we should avoid maximalism and 
universalism in order to avoid moral imperialism, but we should also 
avoid minimalism in order to avoid the danger of setting two norms 
of justice – one for the rich North and one for the rest29.  
Here I want to counteract arguments according to which HRs 
should be minimal because we cannot possibly apply the same 
standards to rich and poor countries. For example, some authors 
(Nickel and Griffin included) argue that the HR to holidays with pay, 
to come back to an example I have used before, cannot be a HR 
because poor countries simply don’t have the resources to implement 
it. This argument creates a double standard that is uncalled for and I 
frankly don’t see why Somalians would not have the right to holidays 
with pay because they happen to be born in a poor country. Of 
course, Nickel and Griffin would agree that we should not have 
double standards, but they offer to drop the right (hence lowering the 
standards to minimal HRs) and I see in that position a depressing 
defeatism. 
It is now important to stress that universalism does not need to entail 
a rejection of local democratic decisions (argument (2)) nor does it 
necessarily go against the idea of self-determination and 
independence (argument (3)). If a State, in an economic situation 
where it cannot possibly do both adequately, decides that funding 
child-rearing is more important than several holidays with pay, it 
should have the democratic prerogatives to implement the first over 
the second. But that is coherent with Benhabib's conception of 
universalism ; HRs are open to deliberation by all reasonable agents, 
with their own culturally and historically constituted ideas of the good 
life30. Note that this deliberation should be an on-going process. Of 
course conflict is unavoidable due to the fact of moral pluralism. But 
that should not be a cause for distress ; if we accept moral 
egalitarianism, which I believe is built-in in both the practice and idea 
of HRs31, one can only argue that it would be morally desirable to set 
______________ 
29 Benhabib, S. (2007), “Another Universalism : On the Unity and Diversity 
of Human Rights”, p. 11. 
30 Ibid., p. 15. 
31 As Buchanan notes it in Buchanan, A. (2010), “The Egalitarianism of 
Human Rights”. 
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up fora in which everyone could deliberate. One can also think that, 
through clashes of ideas, great progress can be made. Of course, I did 
not say anything about feasibility. But keep in mind that, like the 
common good or simply like HRs as we know them here and now, 
“universalism is an aspiration, a moral goal to strive for ; it is not a 
fact, a description of the way the world is32”. 
Admittedly, I have not yet given any reason for a maximalist or 
even a more expansive account of HRs. Even worse, my thesis is in a 
sense question-begging. After all, I say that HRs should not be 
minimalistic because they are not minimalistic. Having said that, I 
hope that my critique of Griffin was sound enough to at least create a 
doubt about the implication of Griffin's strong interpretation of the 
OIC principle for morality and HRs in particular. Moreover, I have 
shown that universalism does not necessarily entail a minimalist 
account of HRs. Now why should HR be kept the way they are, that 
is not minimalist in content or justification ? 
As I said in the introduction, I follow Charles Beitz in taking the 
practice of international human rights as it is. Contrary to Griffin and 
Nickel, my goal was never to give a definition of HRs outside of the 
practice that would entail changes in the list of HRs. But contrary to 
Charles Beitz, I still believe that HRs should be part of a larger 
project towards equality and global justice. 
I have mentioned briefly that what made Beitz shy away from the 
conception I still defend is a legitimate concern for the dangers of 
interventionism. HRs are said to trigger international concern, so 
keeping them as a basis for a more comprehensive theory of justice, 
can have dire consequences given the fact of pluralism in the 
international community and the so-called “anarchism” of 
international relations. To this concern I respond that we already 
have extensive literature on the idea of a just war readily available to 
construct an argumentation on legitimate intervention. Thus we 
already have some of the tools necessary for a critique of 
international relations – human rights' students do not have to do the 
______________ 
32 Benhabib, S. (2007),  “Another Universalism : On the Unity and Diversity 
of Human Rights”, p. 16. 
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work that is already being done elsewhere33. That is what I meant, in 
the introduction, by a division of the moral labour. 
My goal was to focus on the role that HRs and philosophy play in 
society, locally and globally. The practice of HRs is not (and cannot 
be) minimalistic because its purpose is to be critical. They act as a 
guide for action towards justice. A strong feature of the HRs practice 
is precisely its capacity to motivate actors (individuals, NGOs, states, 
political parties, etc.) to petition their government or the international 
community for more respect for HRs or simply to prevent abuse. As 
Beitz says, “[p]articipants in this practice take its central moral ideas 
with great seriousness. Many are empowered by them. Some risk their 
lives for them. Its beneficiaries and potential beneficiaries regard the 
practice as a source of hope34”. 
And that feature is essential for a practice of HR and a philosophy 
that promotes justice and equality for all human beings. I think it is 
safe to say that HRs have high priority for its defenders because they 
cover important issues. And to motivate its defenders HRs have to be 
demanding. They cannot merely protect what people barely have 
already ; for that reason Nickel first argument does not entail 
minimalism.  
One of the main reasons I am very skeptical of a philosophical 
revision of HR that would aim at giving a minimalist account of HRs 
is the fact that philosophical discourse is also part of the practice of HRs. 
Limiting the list of HRs because it is more logically sound or because 
the list would be more consistent is missing the point of HRs and 
HRs’ practice. While I was reflecting on this matter, a strong image, 
even though it is arguably caricaturing, came to me ; imagine if a 
delegation of HRs philosophers were to meet with local activists and 
say : “Hey, you know that right you were fighting for ? Well, it turns out we were 
wrong all along...it's not really a right...sorry... ”. Philosophy has a role to 
play in the struggle for justice and it is not to make the theory appear to be 
more feasible from within, without finding council in other social 
sciences.  
______________ 
33 I am not saying that they should not take those concerns into account. 
Quite the contrary, I am just saying that HR students can concentrate on 
defending a strong conception of HR, while leaving the job of defining what 
is and (especially) what is not a just war for the students of just war theory. 
34 Beitz, C. (2007), The Idea of Human Rights, p. 2. 
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If one has a compartimentalized view of knowledge, society, 
reality, etc., one can easily fall in traps that are easily avoidable when 
the scope of reflection is wider. When political philosophy tries to 
deal with issues that have political, social, and human consequences, 
without taking into account the facts of the political, social and 
human world, one cannot but make mistakes. Of course, theoretical 
simplifications can be useful to isolate a problem (that is to say all 
variables cannot possibly be taken into account in every political 
philosophy reflections). Also, as G.A. Cohen says it : “We cannot 
orient our critical political thinking if we make desirability 
assessments conditional upon feasibility assessments35”. Although the 
position I have defended in this paper is similar to Cohen’s in the 
sense that I tried to show that morality is independent from practice 
or human capacities, I do not go as far as Cohen. I also think that the 
role of philosophy is to tell us what we should think36, but I think it 
also has a practical role. It has to employ the facts gathered by social 
scientists to expand its critique of society, information which in turn 
can be used by the activists to demand justice. If ethics and political 
philosophy lose all contacts with reality, one can seriously doubt their 
usefulness as tools for a critical appraisal of the world as we know it. 
In a sense, settling for a minimalist account of HRs because it fits 
more with our logic or because it makes easier to defend is insulting 
for defenders of HRs who have a legitimate claim for equality on a 
global scale. Arguing that there is no social and economic rights 
because there is no agent capable of fulfilling them or because, 
however desirable they are, they are not feasible is frankly revolting37. 
HRs' discourse is supposed to give people the tools for change, for 
improvement, and for that reason it cannot settle for minimalism ; 
HRs' practice has to be demanding.  
Notice that throughout this paper I have not once come close to 
addressing the very difficult questions of concrete feasibility and 
implementation of the great ideals I defend. One would be right to 
point this out in saying that, with regards to this point, I have the 
burden of the proof. I admit that this is a difficult problem, but I am 
not one to give up before a challenge. One is forced to admit that we 
______________ 
35 Gilabert, P. (2011), “Debate: Feasibility and Socialism”, p. 54. 
36 Ibid, p. 58. 
37 I am aware that this is not the position that Nickel and Griffin defend. 
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have come a long way since the glorious days of slavery and 
colonialism ; progress has been made, and it would be revolting to 
stop when so much has yet to be done to improve the life of all 
individuals.  
If ought implies can, it is true that we ought to take an incremental 
and reformist approach to politics. But at least in some way, aiming 
for the best is a sine qua non condition for the better to be possible. 
HRs as we know them now might be the best we can aim for. 
Achieving the better will perhaps bring forth a new best, and that is a 
good thing. HRs’ practice has and will evolve. 
The task at hand is extremely difficult, but it should not be 
discouraging. It would be a sad day for philosophy (and indeed for 
humanity) if all philosophers simply gave up high ideals when 
confronted by the sheer difficulty of the task to implement them. 
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